



DRAFT

**DRAFT IMPORT POLICY ON THE IMPORTATION OF
SABLE ANTELOPE FROM ZAMBIA**

Directorate: Animal Health

This draft policy is published for comment in terms of the court order of 27 February 2014 Case Number: 64765/2012. This policy deals with the importation of sable antelope from Zambia into the Republic of South Africa.

In compliance with the court order mentioned above an import risk analysis (IRA) was conducted in terms of the OIE Code. The scope of the risk analysis related to the importation of sable antelope from Zambia, with particular reference to the circumstances of the sable antelope mentioned in the import application that formed the basis for the court order mentioned above.

The conclusions regarding the hazards identified in the risk analysis are summarised below.

Amblyomma variegatum

The unrestricted risk of *A. variegatum* was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Negligible Risk* by appropriate acaricide treatment during pre-export quarantine in Zambia as described above.

Anthrax

The symptoms of anthrax are rather specific and passive surveillance, as practiced by Zambia is generally considered adequate for detection. Thus, although not specific for wildlife, the OIE recommendations are considered adequate to manage any anthrax risk in sable imported from Zambia and no further risk assessment is required.

Bluetongue

The unrestricted risk of bluetongue was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following options:

1. Presentation by Zambian authorities of adequate assurances regarding the imports of susceptible species being limited to countries and regions that are free of BT 25 and 26, OR
2. Vector-protected quarantine in accordance with the OIE Code.

Bovine tuberculosis

The unrestricted risk of bovine tuberculosis was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following options:

1. Country or zone freedom in accordance with the OIE Code, OR
2. Herd or Flock freedom in accordance with the OIE Code, OR
3. Government supervised testing of all adult animals on two occasions at least 15 months apart, using the comparative intradermal test, with negative results. The tests to be undertaken whilst in government-supervised isolation from other susceptible species and the last test to be undertaken whilst in pre-export quarantine.

Brucella abortus & Brucella melitensis

The unrestricted risk of brucellosis was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following options:

1. Country or zone freedom in accordance with the OIE Code, OR
2. Herd or Flock freedom in accordance with the OIE Code, OR
3. Serological testing under government supervision of all adult animals on two occasions at least 15 months apart, with negative test results for both the RBT and CFT. All testing to be conducted at a government approved laboratory. The tests to be undertaken whilst in government supervised isolation from other susceptible species and the last test to be undertaken whilst in pre-export quarantine.

Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia

The unrestricted risk of CBPP was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following option:

1. Two serological tests of all animals, with negative results, using either CFT or cELISA, at least 6 months apart. Animals to be held in isolation, subject to continuous government veterinary supervision from the time of the first test, with the second test being during pre-export quarantine, within 30 days of shipment.

Subject to certification by the Zambian veterinary services of the isolation period, the previous test on this particular shipment could be recognised as their first test, so that only the second test during pre-export quarantine would be required for this particular shipment.

Foot and mouth disease

The overall risk estimate for the introduction of FMD in sable imported from Zambia was *Moderate*, in the absence of further risk mitigation measures. Taking into account South Africa's principle that all risk mitigation must be undertaken at the source and the likely extreme consequences of introduction of FMD into South Africa, the only measure that were considered adequate to reduce the risk to an acceptable level of *Very Low Risk* were:

1. importation from an officially Free (OIE recognised) country or zone,
2. importation from a free (self-declared) compartment declared in accordance with the OIE Code,
3. importation from a protection zone that is part of an OIE-recognised infected zone, in accordance with the OIE guidelines, or
4. importation from an infected country or zone that is at Stage 3 or higher on the PCP Pathway for FMD, in accordance with the OIE guidelines.

Nairobi sheep disease

Proposed risk management for Nairobi sheep disease is for imported sable to be maintained in a tick-free quarantine station for a period of at least 21 days prior to export. During this time they are to be treated for ticks with at least two treatments as proposed for prevention of *Amblyomma variegatum*. These measures are considered adequate to reduce the likelihood of entry of Nairobi sheep disease with imported sable to *Negligible*.

Paratuberculosis (Johne's disease)

The unrestricted risk of paratuberculosis was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following option:

1. Pooled faecal culture in liquid medium of all animals with negative results, while in pre-export quarantine. Testing to be undertaken in a government approved laboratory.

Peste des petits ruminants

The unrestricted risk of *PPR* was assessed as *Moderate Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be reduced to *Very Low Risk* by applying the OIE recommendations, provided that Zambian veterinary authorities can provide adequate assurances about *PPR* status, current and historical *PPR* surveillance and ability to manage biosecurity and infection risk during quarantine.

Rabies

Since rabies is a disease that is easy to recognize by the veterinary authorities and thus lends itself to the passive surveillance practiced by Zambia, the OIE recommendations are considered adequate to manage any rabies risk in Sable imported from Zambia and no further risk assessment is required.

Rift Valley Fever

The unrestricted risk of *RVF* was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be reduced to *Very Low Risk* by implementation of a modified version of the OIE guidelines, requiring 14 days in a quarantine station, no clinical signs of *RVF* and protection from exposure to *RVF* during transit, provided that Zambian veterinary authorities can provide adequate demonstration of their ability to detect *RVF* and define an epizootic and inter-epizootic period.

***Theileria* spp (including *T parva*)**

The unrestricted risk of *Theileriosis*, without further risk management, was assessed as *Low Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following risk management options:

1. A single test of all animals, using IFAT and PCR hybridization assay, with negative results for all *Theileria* spp. in all animals during pre-export quarantine, within 30 days of shipment. All animals to also be treated with an acaricide during the quarantine period to eliminate any ticks present; or
2. Introduction of the offspring only, subject to a negative test for theileriosis

Trypanosomosis

The unrestricted risk of trypanosomosis was assessed as *High Risk* to South Africa overall. However, this risk can be readily reduced to *Very Low Risk* by the following options:

1. a single PCR and RFLP assay with negative results (for all trypanosomes) on all sable while in pre-export quarantine for the shipment to be accepted, with testing to be undertaken in a government approved laboratory; or
2. Introduction of the offspring only, subject to a negative PCR for trypanosomosis

As part of the risk analysis, questionnaires were sent to Zambia to obtain the required information from the exporting country according to the OIE guidelines. The information that Zambia provided was not sufficient to allow the South African Veterinary Authority to confirm compliance with all the relevant Articles of the OIE guidelines. Further information was sought but was not received by the time of finalising the IRA.

Considering Zambia's reliance on passive surveillance, the information provided raised doubt over whether Zambia would be in a position to detect exotic and trade-sensitive diseases, like CBPP, PPR, Nairobi sheep disease, Rift Valley Fever etc. in a timely and reliable manner. It also raised doubts about the efficacy of any disease control and biosecurity efforts being instituted by the Government Veterinary Authorities in Zambia, including the ability of Zambia to provide trade-related guarantees, like those for the certification of effective pre-export quarantine of live animals.

Based on the information received from Zambia, it also served no purpose in organizing a visit to Zambia as the information supplied was far from sufficient to warrant a verification exercise.

In reference to the IRA conducted, it has thus been concluded that the risk of importing sable antelope from Zambia is unacceptable given the information available at this point in time.